Modern hardware systems are composed of a variety of third-party Intellectual Property (IP) cores to implement their overall functionality. Since hardware design is a globalized process involving various (untrusted) stakeholders, a secure management of the valuable IP between authors and users is inevitable to protect them from unauthorized access and modification. To this end, the widely adopted IEEE standard 1735-2014 was created to ensure confidentiality and integrity. In this paper, we outline structural weaknesses in IEEE 1735 that cannot be fixed with cryptographic solutions (given the contemporary hardware design process) and thus render the standard inherently insecure. We practically demonstrate the weaknesses by recovering the private keys of IEEE 1735 implementations from major Electronic Design Automation (EDA) tool vendors, namely Intel, Xilinx, Cadence, Siemens, Microsemi, and Lattice, while results on a seventh case study are withheld. As a consequence, we can decrypt, modify, and re-encrypt all allegedly protected IP cores designed for the respective tools, thus leading to an industry-wide break. As part of this analysis, we are the first to publicly disclose three RSA-based white-box schemes that are used in real-world products and present cryptanalytical attacks for all of them, finally resulting in key recovery.
翻译:现代硬件系统由各种第三方知识产权(IP)核心组成,以实施其总体功能。由于硬件设计是一个全球化过程,涉及各种(不受信任的)利益攸关方,因此在作者和用户之间对宝贵的IP进行安全管理是不可避免的,以保护他们不受未经授权的进入和修改。为此,广泛采用的IEE 标准1735-2014是为了保密和完整而建立的。在本文件中,我们概述了IEEE 1735中无法用加密解决方案(包括当代硬件设计程序)加以固定的结构性缺陷,从而使得标准本身变得不安全。我们通过从主要的电子设计自动化工具供应商(即Intel、Xilinx、Cadence、Siemens、Microsemie和Lattice)中恢复IEEE 1735执行的私人钥匙,实际显示了这些弱点。因此,我们可以解密、修改和重新加密所有据称为各自工具而受保护的IP核心,从而导致整个行业的崩溃。作为分析的一部分,我们是在最终公开披露了所有核心的回收计划。