Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks are one the most common and consequential cyber attacks in computer networks. While existing research offers a plethora of detection methods, the issue of achieving both scalability and high detection accuracy remains open. In this work, we address this problem by developing a differential method based on generalized entropy progression. In this method, we continuously fit the line of best fit to the entropy progression and check if the derivative, that is, the slope of this line is less than the negative of the dynamically computed standard deviation of the derivatives. As a result, we omit the usage of the thresholds and the results with five real-world network traffic datasets confirm that our method outperforms threshold-based DoS attack detection by two orders of magnitude on average. Our method achieves false positive rates that are up to 7% where the arithmetic mean is 3% with Tsallis entropy and only 5% sampling of the total network flow. Moreover, since the main computation cost of our method is the entropy computation, which is linear in the volume of the unit-time network flow and it uses integer only operations and a small fraction of the total flow, it is therefore lightweight and scalable.
翻译:拒绝服务(DoS)攻击是计算机网络中最常见的、随之而来的网络攻击。 虽然现有的研究提供了大量探测方法, 但仍存在着实现可缩放性和高检测精确度的问题。 在这项工作中, 我们通过开发基于普遍星盘递进的差别方法来解决这个问题。 在这种方法中, 我们持续地将最适合于星盘进程的线条匹配, 如果衍生物, 也就是说, 这条线的斜度低于动态计算标准衍生物偏差的负值。 因此, 我们忽略了使用阈值和5个真实世界网络流量数据集的结果, 从而证实我们的方法比基于临界值的多斯平均袭击量高出两个级。 我们的方法达到7%的假正率, 其计算平均值为3%, Tsalllis entropy, 并且只有5% 的网络总流量取样。 此外, 我们方法的主要计算成本是英特基计算, 它在单位时间网络流量中线直线, 并且它只使用小量的运行量, 因此它使用小量的精度, 。