Engineers have numerous low-power wireless sensor devices in the current network setup for the Internet of Things, such as ZigBee, LoRaWAN, ANT, or Bluetooth. These low-power wireless sensors are the best candidates to transfer and collect data. But they are all vulnerable to the physical jamming attack since it is not costly for the attackers to run low power jammer sources in these networks. Having multiple gateways and providing alternative connections to sensors would help these networks to mitigate successful jamming. In this paper, we propose an analytical model to solve the problem of gateway selection and association based on a Stackelberg game, where the jammer is the follower. We first formulate the payoffs of both sensor network and attacker and then establish and prove the conditions leading to NASH equilibrium. With numerical investigation, we also present how our model can capture the performance of sensor networks under jamming with a varying number of gateways. Our results show that compared to the single gateway scenario, the network's throughput will improve by 26% and 60% when we deploy two and four gateways in the presence of a single jammer.
翻译:工程师们在目前互联网网络设置中拥有许多低功率无线传感器设备, 如 Zigbee、 LoRawAN、 ANT、 蓝牙等。 这些低功率无线传感器是传输和收集数据的最佳选择者。 但是他们都容易受到物理干扰攻击的伤害, 因为攻击者在这些网络中运行低功率干扰源的成本并不高。 拥有多个网关和向传感器提供替代连接可以帮助这些网络减少成功的干扰。 在本文中, 我们提出了一个分析模型, 以解决网关选择和关联的问题, 以斯塔克尔伯格游戏为基础, 干扰器是该游戏的追随者。 我们首先制定传感器网络和攻击者的报酬, 然后确定和证明导致纳希平衡的条件。 通过数字调查, 我们还展示了我们的模型如何捕捉到传感器网络的性能, 与不同数量的网关连接。 我们的结果表明, 与单一网关的情景相比, 当我们部署单个干扰器的两、 四个网关时, 网络的吞吐量将增加26%和60%。