Security issue of distributed state estimation (DSE) is an important prospect for the rapidly growing smart grid ecosystem. Any coordinated cyberattack targeting the distributed system of state estimators can cause unrestrained estimation errors and can lead to a myriad of security risks, including failure of power system operation. This article explores the security threats of a smart grid arising from the exploitation of DSE vulnerabilities. To this aim, novel adversarial strategies based on two-stage data availability and integrity attacks are proposed towards a distributed industrial Internet of Things-based smart grid. The former's attack goal is to prevent boundary data exchange among distributed control centers, while the latter's attack goal is to inject a falsified data to cause local and global system unobservability. The proposed framework is evaluated on IEEE standard 14-bus system and benchmarked against the state-of-the-art research. Experimental results show that the proposed two-stage cyberattack results in an estimated error of approximately 34.74% compared to an error of the order of 10^-3 under normal operating conditions.
翻译:分布式国家估计(DSE)的安全问题是迅速增长的智能电网生态系统的一个重要前景。针对分布式国家测算员系统的任何协调一致的网络攻击都可能造成无节制的估计误差,并可能导致多种安全风险,包括电力系统运行失败。本条款探讨了利用DSE脆弱性产生的智能电网的安全威胁。为此,基于两阶段数据可用性和完整性攻击的新对抗战略被提议为基于基于事物的智能电网的分布式工业互联网。前者的攻击目标是防止分布式控制中心之间的边界数据交换,而后者的攻击目标是输入伪造的数据,造成本地和全球系统无法观测。拟议框架根据IEEEE标准14型客车系统进行评估,并以最新技术研究为基准。实验结果显示,拟议的两阶段网络攻击估计出误差约34.74%,而正常运行条件下的顺序为10 ⁇ -3。