We present our experimental results of simulating the school choice problem which deals with the assignment of students to schools based on each group's complete preference list for the other group using two algorithms: Boston mechanism and student-proposing Gale-Shapley algorithm. We compare the effects of sophisticated students altering their preference lists with regards to these two algorithms. Our simulation results show that sophisticated students can benefit more in Boston mechanism compared to Gale-Shapley algorithm based on multiple evaluation metrics.
翻译：我们展示了模拟学校选择问题的实验结果,根据每个群体对另一群体的完全偏好列表,用两种算法(波士顿机制和学生推荐的Gale-Shapley算法)将学生分配到学校。我们比较了尖端学生改变其偏好列表对这两种算法的影响。我们的模拟结果表明,与基于多种评估指标的Gale-Shappley算法相比,在波士顿机制中,尖端学生能够比Gale-Shapley算法受益更多。
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