Oblivious RAM (ORAM) protocols are powerful techniques that hide a client's data as well as access patterns from untrusted service providers. We present an oblivious cloud storage system, ObliviSync, that specifically targets one of the most widely-used personal cloud storage paradigms: synchronization and backup services, popular examples of which are Dropbox, iCloud Drive, and Google Drive. This setting provides a unique opportunity because the above privacy properties can be achieved with a simpler form of ORAM called write-only ORAM, which allows for dramatically increased efficiency compared to related work. Our solution is asymptotically optimal and practically efficient, with a small constant overhead of approximately 4x compared with non-private file storage, depending only on the total data size and parameters chosen according to the usage rate, and not on the number or size of individual files. Our construction also offers protection against timing-channel attacks, which has not been previously considered in ORAM protocols. We built and evaluated a full implementation of ObliviSync that supports multiple simultaneous read-only clients and a single concurrent read/write client whose edits automatically and seamlessly propagate to the readers. We show that our system functions under high work loads, with realistic file size distributions, and with small additional latency (as compared to a baseline encrypted file system) when paired with Dropbox as the synchronization service.
翻译:隐蔽的 RAM (ORAM) 协议是隐藏客户数据以及来自不受信任的服务提供商的访问模式的强大技术。 我们展示了一个隐蔽的云存储系统 ObliviSync, 具体针对最广泛使用的个人云存储模式之一: 同步和备份服务, 其流行范例是 Droppox、 iCloud Drive 和 Google Drive 。 这个设置提供了一个独特的机会, 因为上述隐私属性可以通过一个更简单的 ORAM 形式实现, 称为只写 ORAM, 从而能够大大提高相关工作的效率。 我们的解决方案是尽可能优化的、 实际高效的, 与非私有文件存储相比, 其小型的常备费用大约为4x, 仅取决于根据使用率选择的总数据大小和参数, 而不是单个文件的数量或大小。 我们的建筑工程也提供了防止时间屏障攻击, 而这以前在 ORAM 协议中未曾考虑过。 我们建立并评价了ObliviSync 的全面实施情况, 支持多个同时读客户和一个同时读/ 的同步读写/ 客户, 在一个小的同步的客户, 和无缝的同步的服务器, 将显示到一个高同步的系统, 以自动和同步的同步的同步的同步的同步的服务器显示, 将显示我们以高的同步的同步的同步的同步的系统 以显示为同步的同步的同步的同步的同步的同步的同步的系统运行的服务器 。