Many researchers and policymakers have expressed excitement about how algorithmic explanations may enable more fair and responsible decision-making. However, recent experimental studies have found that explanations do not always improve human use of algorithmic advice. In this study, we shed light on how people interpret and respond to counterfactual explanations (CFEs) -- an explanation that shows how a model's output changes with marginal changes to an input -- in the context of pretrial risk assessment instruments (PRAIs). We ran think-aloud trials with eight sitting US state court judges, providing them with recommendations from the PRAI as well as CFEs. At first, judges misinterpreted the counterfactuals as real -- rather than hypothetical -- changes to defendants. Once judges understood what the counterfactuals meant, they ignored them, stating they must make decisions based only on the actual defendant in question. They also expressed a mix of reasons for ignoring or following the advice of the PRAI. These results add to the literature on how people use algorithms and explanations in unexpected ways and the challenges associated with creating effective human-algorithm collaboration.
翻译:许多研究人员和决策者对算法解释如何能促成更公平和更负责任的决策表示兴奋。然而,最近的实验研究发现,解释并不总是能够改善人类对算法建议的使用。在本研究中,我们阐明了人们如何解释和回应反事实解释(CFES) -- -- 该解释表明模型的产出变化如何与投入的微小变化 -- -- 在审前风险评估工具(PRAIs)中是如何发生的。我们与8名现任美国州法院法官进行了思考式审判,向他们提供了来自PRAI和CFES的建议。首先,法官将反事实解释为对被告的真实 -- -- 而不是假设 -- -- 变化。一旦法官理解反事实意味着什么,他们就忽略了这些事实,说他们必须仅仅根据所涉实际被告做出决定。他们还表达了无视或遵循PRAI建议的各种理由。这些结果增加了关于人们如何以意想不到的方式使用算法和解释的文献,以及与创造有效人与格合作有关的挑战。