In successful enterprise attacks, adversaries often need to gain access to additional machines beyond their initial point of compromise, a set of internal movements known as lateral movement. We present Hopper, a system for detecting lateral movement based on commonly available enterprise logs. Hopper constructs a graph of login activity among internal machines and then identifies suspicious sequences of loginsthat correspond to lateral movement. To understand the larger context of each login, Hopper employs an inference algorithm to identify the broader path(s) of movement that each login belongs to and the causal user responsible for performing a path's logins. Hopper then leverages this path inference algorithm, in conjunction with a set of detection rules and a new anomaly scoring algorithm, to surface the login paths most likely to reflect lateral movement. On a 15-month enterprise dataset consisting of over 780 million internal logins, Hop-per achieves a 94.5% detection rate across over 300 realistic attack scenarios, including one red team attack, while generating an average of <9 alerts per day. In contrast, to detect the same number of attacks, prior state-of-the-art systems would need to generate nearly 8x as many false positives.
翻译:在成功的企业袭击中,对手往往需要获得超出最初妥协点之外的更多机器,即一套被称为横向运动的内部运动。我们介绍Hopper,这是一个基于现有企业日志的横向运动检测系统。Hopper在内部机器中构建了一个登录活动的图,然后确定了与横向运动相对应的可疑的登录序列。为了理解每个登录的更大背景,Hopper使用一种推算法,以确定每个登录点所属的移动的更广泛路径,以及负责执行路径登录的因果用户。Hopper然后利用这条路径的推断算法,加上一套探测规则和新的异常评分算法,以显示最可能反映横向运动的登录路径。在一个由7.8亿以上内部日志组成的15个月企业数据集中,Hopper在300多个现实攻击情景中达到94.5%的检测率,包括一次红色团队袭击,同时生成平均 < 9 警报。相比之下,要探测相同数量的袭击,先是状态系统,然后是正态系统,几乎需要生成。