Presence often is considered the most important quale describing the subjective feeling of being in a computer-generated (virtual) or computer-mediated environment. The identification and separation of two orthogonal presence components, i.e., the place illusion and the plausibility illusion, has been an accepted theoretical model describing Virtual Reality (VR) experiences for some time. In this model, immersion is a proposed contributing factor to the place illusion. Lately, copresence and social presence illusions have extended this model, and coherence was proposed as a contributing factor to the plausibility illusion. Such factors strive to identify (objectively) measurable characteristics of an experience, e.g., systems properties that allow controlled manipulations of VR experiences. This perspective article challenges this presence-oriented VR theory. First, we argue that a place illusion cannot be the major construct to describe the much wider scope of Virtual, Augmented, and Mixed Reality (VR, AR, MR: or XR for short). Second, we argue that there is no plausibility illusion but merely plausibility, and we derive the place illusion as a consequence of a plausible generation of spatial cues, and similarly for all of the current model's so-defined illusions. Finally, we propose coherence and plausibility to become the central essential conditions in a novel theoretical model describing XR experiences and effects.
翻译:存在通常被认为是描述在计算机产生的(虚拟)或计算机中介环境中的主观感觉的最重大夸大。 识别和分离两种正正统存在组成部分(即,地点错觉和可信幻觉)是一个公认的理论模型,描述虚拟现实(VR)的经验已有一段时间了。 在这个模型中,沉浸是提出地方错觉的一个拟议因素。 最近,共性和社会存在幻觉扩展了这一模型,提出了一致性,作为造就假象的一个促进因素。 这些因素努力(客观地)确定和分离一种经验的可测量特征,例如,允许受控操纵VR经验的系统属性。 这个观点文章挑战了这种面向虚拟现实(VR)的理论。 首先,我们认为,一个地方错觉不能成为描述虚拟、放大和混合真实(VR、AR、M、或XR短时间)的更广泛范围的主要构思。 其次,我们提出,不存在可信的假象,而只是可以令人信服的,我们最终提出了一个稳定的空间错觉,成为了我们所定义的视觉和真实性最终结果。