In e-commerce advertising, it is crucial to jointly consider various performance metrics, e.g., user experience, advertiser utility, and platform revenue. Traditional auction mechanisms, such as GSP and VCG auctions, can be suboptimal due to their fixed allocation rules to optimize a single performance metric (e.g., revenue or social welfare). Recently, data-driven auctions, learned directly from auction outcomes to optimize multiple performance metrics, have attracted increasing research interests. However, the procedure of auction mechanisms involves various discrete calculation operations, making it challenging to be compatible with continuous optimization pipelines in machine learning. In this paper, we design \underline{D}eep \underline{N}eural \underline{A}uctions (DNAs) to enable end-to-end auction learning by proposing a differentiable model to relax the discrete sorting operation, a key component in auctions. We optimize the performance metrics by developing deep models to efficiently extract contexts from auctions, providing rich features for auction design. We further integrate the game theoretical conditions within the model design, to guarantee the stability of the auctions. DNAs have been successfully deployed in the e-commerce advertising system at Taobao. Experimental evaluation results on both large-scale data set as well as online A/B test demonstrated that DNAs significantly outperformed other mechanisms widely adopted in industry.
翻译:在电子商务广告中,必须共同考虑各种业绩衡量标准,例如用户经验、广告业和平台收入等。传统拍卖机制,如普惠制和VCG拍卖等,由于固定分配规则优化单一业绩衡量标准(如收入或社会福利),因此可能不尽理想。最近,数据驱动拍卖直接从拍卖结果中学习,以优化多种业绩衡量标准,吸引了越来越多的研究兴趣。然而,拍卖机制的程序涉及各种离散的计算操作,使其难以与机器学习的持续优化管道相兼容。在本文件中,我们设计了传统拍卖机制,如普惠制和VCG拍卖,因为其固定分配规则可以优化单一业绩衡量标准(如收入或社会福利)。最近,数据驱动拍卖直接从拍卖结果中学习,从而吸引了越来越多的研究兴趣。我们优化了业绩衡量标准,开发了深层模型,以高效地从拍卖中提取背景,为拍卖设计提供了丰富的特征。我们进一步将游戏理论条件纳入了模型设计中,以广泛保证在线拍卖机制的稳定性,从而在大型拍卖中成功运用了A-A级测试数据。