Sensors are one of the most pervasive and integral components of today's safety-critical systems. Sensors serve as a bridge between physical quantities and connected systems. The connected systems with sensors blindly believe the sensor as there is no way to authenticate the signal coming from a sensor. This could be an entry point for an attacker. An attacker can inject a fake input signal along with the legitimate signal by using a suitable spoofing technique. As the sensor's transducer is not smart enough to differentiate between a fake and legitimate signal, the injected fake signal eventually can collapse the connected system. This type of attack is known as the transduction attack. Over the last decade, several works have been published to provide a defense against the transduction attack. However, the defenses are proposed on an ad-hoc basis; hence, they are not well-structured. Our work begins to fill this gap by providing a checklist that a defense technique should always follow to be considered as an ideal defense against the transduction attack. We name this checklist as the Golden reference of sensor defense. We provide insights on how this Golden reference can be achieved and argue that sensors should be redesigned from the transducer level to the sensor electronics level. We point out that only hardware or software modification is not enough; instead, a hardware/software (HW/SW) co-design approach is required to ride on this future roadmap to the robust and resilient sensor.
翻译:传感器是当今安全临界系统最普遍和完整的组成部分之一。 传感器作为物理数量和连接系统之间的桥梁。 与传感器连接的系统盲目地相信传感器, 因为无法验证传感器发出的信号。 这可能是攻击者的切入点。 攻击者可以使用适当的伪装技术, 将假输入信号与合法信号一起输入。 由于传感器的传送器不够聪明, 无法区分假的和合法的信号, 注入的假信号最终会摧毁连接系统。 这种类型的攻击被称为感应攻击。 在过去的十年里, 已经出版了几部作品, 以提供防御感应攻击的防线。 但是, 这可能是攻击者的切入点。 攻击者可以使用适当的伪装技术, 将假输入信号与合法信号一起输入一个虚假的输入信号。 由于传感器的传送器不够聪明, 因此, 我们的工作开始填补这一空白, 提供一份清单, 防御技术应该总是被视为一种理想的防感应感应识的防方法。 我们把这个清单命名为传感器的黄金参考。 这种类型的攻击被称为感应如何实现的感应变攻击。 在过去十年中, 我们提供了如何实现这种金质参考, 的参考, 的参考, 我们提供了如何能参照值的参考值, 的参照器应该从感官水平, 而不是感应变的感应到感应变的感官级的感应器, 应该器, 。