Choice architecture describes the design by which choices are presented to people. Nudges are an aspect intended to make "good" outcomes easy, such as using password meters to encourage strong passwords. Sludge, on the contrary, is friction that raises the transaction cost and is often seen as a negative to users. Turning this concept around, we propose applying sludge for positive cybersecurity outcomes by using it offensively to consume attackers' time and other resources. To date, most cyber defenses have been designed to be optimally strong and effective and prohibit or eliminate attackers as quickly as possible. Our complimentary approach is to also deploy defenses that seek to maximize the consumption of the attackers' time and other resources while causing as little damage as possible to the victim. This is consistent with zero trust and similar mindsets which assume breach. The Sludge Strategy introduces cost-imposing cyber defense by strategically deploying friction for attackers before, during, and after an attack using deception and authentic design features. We present the characteristics of effective sludge, and show a continuum from light to heavy sludge. We describe the quantitative and qualitative costs to attackers and offer practical considerations for deploying sludge in practice. Finally, we examine real-world examples of U.S. government operations to frustrate and impose cost on cyber adversaries.
翻译:选择结构描述向人们提供选择的设计。 标记是一个旨在让“ 好”结果容易实现的方面, 例如使用密码表鼓励强大的密码。 相反, 滑块是摩擦, 增加交易费用, 常常被视为对用户不利。 翻转这个概念, 我们提议使用污泥来获取正面的网络安全结果, 攻击前、 攻击期间和攻击后用欺骗和真实的设计特征对攻击者进行战略上的摩擦, 从而施加成本性网络防御。 我们提出有效污泥的特征, 并显示从轻到重污泥的连续性。 我们的补充性做法是部署防御, 尽量扩大攻击者的时间和其他资源的消耗, 同时尽可能减少受害者所受的损害。 这与零信任和假定违约的类似心态是一致的。 滑块战略引入了成本性网络防御, 我们用欺骗和真实的设计特征对攻击者进行战略上的摩擦。 我们介绍了有效污泥的特点, 显示从轻到重淤泥的连续体。 我们描述攻击者在数量上和定性上的代价, 并提出在实践中部署淤泥体的实际考虑。