We introduce password strength information signaling as a novel, yet counter-intuitive, defense mechanism against password cracking attacks. Recent breaches have exposed billions of user passwords to the dangerous threat of offline password cracking attacks. An offline attacker can quickly check millions (or sometimes billions/trillions) of password guesses by comparing their hash value with the stolen hash from a breached authentication server. The attacker is limited only by the resources he is willing to invest. Our key idea is to have the authentication server store a (noisy) signal about the strength of each user password for an offline attacker to find. Surprisingly, we show that the noise distribution for the signal can often be tuned so that a rational (profit-maximizing) attacker will crack fewer passwords. The signaling scheme exploits the fact that password cracking is not a zero-sum game i.e., the attacker's profit is given by the value of the cracked passwords minus the total guessing cost. Thus, a well-defined signaling strategy will encourage the attacker to reduce his guessing costs by cracking fewer passwords. We use an evolutionary algorithm to compute the optimal signaling scheme for the defender. As a proof-of-concept, we evaluate our mechanism on several password datasets and show that it can reduce the total number of cracked passwords by up to $12\%$ (resp. $5\%$) of all users in defending against offline (resp. online) attacks.
翻译:我们引入了密码强度信息, 这是一种新颖的、 反直觉的、 防御机制, 以对抗密码攻击。 最近发生的违规事件暴露了数十亿用户密码, 暴露了离线密码打击攻击的危险威胁。 离线攻击者可以通过比较被破坏的认证服务器上的散列值和被盗散装散装散装物来快速检查数以百万计( 有时甚至数十亿/万亿)的密码猜测。 攻击者只受到他愿意投资的资源的限制。 我们的关键想法是让认证服务器存储一个( 噪音) 信号, 显示每个用户密码在离线攻击者查找时的强度。 令人惊讶的是, 我们显示信号发送器的噪音分布往往可以调整, 以便一个理性( 盈利性- 最大化) 攻击者破解密码, 利用密码破解不是零和游戏, 也就是说, 攻击者的利润来自错误的密码值减去全部猜算成本。 因此, 一个定义清晰的信号战略将鼓励攻击者减少他对非线攻击者的总测算成本。 通过解析的密码, 我们使用一个演算系统来评估一个最精确的密码机制, 。