Many centralized matching markets are preceded by interviews between the participants. We study the impact on the final match of an increase to the number of interviews one side of the market can participate in. Our motivation is the match between residents and hospitals where, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, interviews for the 2020-21 season of the NRMP match have switched to a virtual format. This has drastically reduced the cost to applicants of accepting interview offers. However, the reduction in cost is not symmetric since applicants, not programs, bore most of the costs of in-person interviews. We show that if doctors are willing to accept more interviews but the hospitals do not increase the number of interviews they offer, no doctor will be better off and potentially many doctors will be harmed. This adverse consequence results from a mechanism we describe as interview hoarding. We prove this analytically and characterize optimal mitigation strategies for special cases. We use simulations to extend the insights from our analytical results to more general settings.
翻译：许多集中的匹配市场之前先进行参与者之间的访谈。我们研究了增加市场一方可以参与的访谈数量对最终匹配的影响。我们的动机是居民和医院之间的匹配,由于COVID-19大流行病,2020-21年NRMP比赛季节的访谈已转换为虚拟形式。这极大地降低了接受面试的申请人的费用。然而,成本的降低并不对称,因为申请人而不是程序承担了面对面访谈的大部分费用。我们表明,如果医生愿意接受更多访谈,但医院不增加他们提供的访谈数量,医生就不会有更好的出场,而且可能有许多医生会受到伤害。这种不利的后果来自我们描述的作为访谈掩藏的机制。我们用这种分析来证明这种分析,并描述特殊案例的最佳缓解战略。我们用模拟方法将分析结果的洞见扩大到更一般的环境。
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