We complete the characterization of the computational complexity of equilibrium in public goods games on graphs by proving that the problem is NP-complete for every finite non-monotone best-response pattern. This answers the open problem of [Gilboa and Nisan, 2022], and completes the answer to a question raised by [Papadimitriou and Peng, 2021], for all finite best-response patterns.
翻译:我们通过证明每个有限的非单体最佳反应模式都存在问题,从而完成了图表上公共产品游戏平衡计算复杂性的定性。 这解决了[Gilboa和Nisan,2022年]的未决问题,并完成了对所有有限最佳反应模式[Papadimitriou和Peng,2021年]的回答。