The COVID-19 pandemic has caused many countries to deploy novel digital contact tracing (DCT) systems to boost the efficiency of manual tracing of infection chains. In this paper, we systematically analyze DCT solutions and categorize them based on their design approaches and architectures. We analyze them with regard to effectiveness, security, privacy, and ethical aspects and compare prominent solutions with regard to these requirements. In particular, we discuss the shortcomings of the Google and Apple Exposure Notification API (GAEN) that is currently widely adopted all over the world. We find that the security and privacy of GAEN have considerable deficiencies as it can be compromised by severe, large-scale attacks. We also discuss other proposed approaches for contact tracing, including our proposal TRACECORONA, that are based on Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange and aim at tackling shortcomings of existing solutions. Our extensive analysis shows thatTRACECORONA fulfills the above security requirements better than deployed state-of-the-art approaches. We have implementedTRACECORONA, and its beta test version has been used by more than 2000 users without any major functional problems, demonstrating that there are no technical reasons requiring to make compromises with regard to the requirements of DCTapproaches.
翻译:COVID-19大流行的COVID-19大流行已导致许多国家采用新的数字联系追踪系统,以提高人工追踪感染链的效率;在本文件中,我们系统地分析DCT解决方案,并根据设计方法和结构对其进行分类;我们从有效性、安全、隐私和道德方面分析这些解决方案,并比较与这些要求有关的突出解决方案;特别是,我们讨论了目前在世界各地广泛采用的谷歌和苹果接触通知API(GAEN)的缺点;我们发现GAEN的安全和隐私存在相当大的缺陷,因为它可能受到大规模严重袭击的危害;我们还讨论了其他拟议的接触追踪方法,包括我们基于Diffie-Hellman(DH)关键交换的TRACORONA提案,目的是解决现有解决方案的缺陷;我们的广泛分析表明,TRACONA比采用的最新方法更能满足上述安全要求;我们实施了TRACEONOA,其乙型测试版本在2000年以上的用户中被使用,没有重大功能问题,这表明没有任何技术理由需要做出妥协,以达到DACH的要求。