Punishing those who refuse to participate in common efforts is a known and intensively studied way to maintain cooperation among self-interested agents. But this act is costly, hence punishers who are generally also engaged in the original joint venture, become vulnerable, which jeopardizes the effectiveness of this incentive. As an alternative, we may hire special players, whose only duty is to watch the population and punish defectors. Such a policelike or mercenary punishment can be maintained by a tax-based fund. If this tax is negligible, a cyclic dominance may emerge among different strategies. When this tax is relevant then this solution disappears. In the latter case, the fine level becomes a significant factor that determines whether punisher players coexist with cooperators or alternatively with defectors. The maximal average outcome can be reached at an intermediate cost value of punishment. Our observations highlight that we should take special care when such kind of punishment and accompanying tax are introduced to reach a collective goal.
翻译:惩罚那些拒绝参加共同努力的人是众所周知的、经过深入研究的维护自身利益代理人之间合作的方法。但是,这一行为代价高昂,因此一般也参与原始合资企业的处罚者变得脆弱,从而危及这一奖励措施的效力。作为替代办法,我们可以雇用特别的玩家,他们的唯一职责是监视人口并惩罚叛逃者。这种警察式或雇佣军惩罚可由基于税收的基金维持。如果这种税种微不足道,则可能出现循环支配,当这种税种适切时,这种解决办法就会消失。在后一种情况下,罚款水平成为决定惩罚者是否与合作者或与叛逃者并存的重要因素。最高平均结果可以达到中等程度的惩罚成本价值。我们的意见强调,在引入这种惩罚和附带税来达到集体目标时,我们应该特别小心。