This work establishes a game-theoretic framework to study cross-layer coordinated attacks on cyber-physical systems (CPSs). The attacker can interfere with the physical process and launch jamming attacks on the communication channels simultaneously. At the same time, the defender can dodge the jamming by dispensing with observations. The generic framework captures a wide variety of classic attack models on CPSs. Leveraging dynamic programming techniques, we fully characterize the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) control strategies. We also derive the SPE observation and jamming strategies and provide efficient computational methods to compute them. The results demonstrate that the physical and cyber attacks are coordinated and depend on each other. On the one hand, the control strategies are linear in the state estimate, and the estimate error caused by jamming attacks will induce performance degradation. On the other hand, the interactions between the attacker and the defender in the physical layer significantly impact the observation and jamming strategies. Numerical examples illustrate the interactions between the defender and the attacker through their observation and jamming strategies.
翻译:这项工作建立了一个游戏理论框架,以研究对网络物理系统的跨层协调攻击。攻击者可以同时干扰物理过程和对通信渠道发动干扰攻击。同时,捍卫者可以通过提供观测来躲避干扰。通用框架捕捉了对CPS的多种典型攻击模式。利用动态编程技术,我们充分描述Subgame 完美平衡(SPE)控制战略的特性。我们还从中得出SPE观察和干扰战略,并提供有效的计算方法来计算这些战略。结果显示,物理和网络攻击是相互协调的,并且相互依赖。一方面,国家估计的控制战略是直线的,而干扰攻击造成的估计错误将导致性能退化。另一方面,攻击者与物理层的捍卫者之间的相互作用对观测和干扰战略产生重大影响。数字示例说明了捍卫者与攻击者通过观察和干扰战略进行的互动。