Second-price auctions with deposits are frequently used in blockchain environments. An auction takes place on-chain: bidders deposit an amount that fully covers their bid in a smart contract. The deposit is used as insurance against bidders not honoring their bid if they win. The deposit, but not the bid, is publicly observed during the bidding phase of the auction. The visibility of deposits can fundamentally change the strategic structure of the auction if bidding happens sequentially: Bidding is costly since the deposit has to be staked for a substantial amount of time. Thus, deposits can be used as a costly signal for a high valuation. This is the source of multiple inefficiencies: To engage in costly signaling, a bidder who bids first and has a high valuation will generally over-deposit in equilibrium, i.e. deposit more than he will bid. If high valuations are likely there can, moreover, be entry deterrence through high deposits: a bidder who bids first can deter subsequent bidders from entering the auction. Pooling can happen in equilibrium, where bidders of different valuations deposit the same amount. The auction fails to allocate the item to the bidder with the highest valuation.
翻译:含有押金的第二次价格拍卖经常在连锁环境中进行。拍卖在链条上进行:投标人在一个聪明的合同中交存一个完全覆盖其出价的数额。存款是用来作为对不兑现其出价的投标人进行保险的,如果他们获胜的话。在拍卖的投标阶段公开看到存款,而不是出价。如果投标按顺序进行,存款的能见度可以从根本上改变拍卖的战略结构:投标费用昂贵,因为押金必须花大量时间的赌注。因此,存款可以用作高估价的一个昂贵的信号。这是多种低效率的根源:进行昂贵的信号,首先出价而且有高估价的投标人一般会超额在均衡的押金,也就是说,比他出价多。此外,如果高估价有可能通过高押金产生进入的威慑力:首先出价的投标人可以阻止随后的投标人参加拍卖。联营可以以平衡方式发生,不同估价的投标人将同样数额存入同一数额的押金。拍卖未能将物品分配给出价人,最高估价。