Inferring the prior in routing games using public signalling

This paper considers Bayesian persuasion for routing games where information about the uncertain state of the network is provided by a traffic information system (TIS) using public signals. In this setup, the TIS commits to a signalling scheme and participants form a posterior belief about the state of the network based on prior beliefs and received signal. They subsequently select routes minimizing their individual expected travel time under their posterior beliefs, giving rise to a Wardrop equilibrium. We investigate how the TIS can infer the prior beliefs held by the participants by designing suitable signalling schemes, and observing the equilibrium flows under different signals. We show that under mild conditions a signalling scheme that allows for exact inference of the prior exists. We then provide an iterative algorithm that finds such a scheme in a finite number of steps. Finally, we show how in the simplified 2-road, 2-state case such a scheme can be constructed without the need for a sequential procedure. Several examples illustrate our results.