With the popularity of wireless charging, energy access protection and cybersecurity are gaining importance, especially in public places. Currently, the most common energy encryption method uses frequency and associated impedance variation. However, we have proven that this method is not reliable, since a hacker can detect the changing frequency and adjust the compensation. However, the previously presented system needed time to follow the updated frequency, while encryption systems may vary the frequency faster to avoid energy theft. Furthermore, the previous system required an additional sensor coil. To solve these problems, we optimized the attack and the associated system, which can intrude and steal energy within 0.2 ms. The key is the elimination of the time-consuming maximum receiver current regulation. Also, we use the main receiving coil rather than any additional sensor antenna to detect the magnetic field. Thus, the new hardware is even simpler. A simulation model and experimental results demonstrate the fast response speed of the attack on encrypted wireless power and steal 65% of the power. Overall, the applicability of the attack is highly improved and leaves less room for hardening the encryption. The results demonstrate that energy access protection needs to be given great attention.
翻译:随着无线充电的普及,能量接入保护与网络安全日益重要,尤其在公共场所。目前,最常见的能量加密方法是利用频率及其关联的阻抗变化。然而,我们已证明该方法并不可靠,因为攻击者可以检测到变化的频率并调整补偿。然而,先前提出的系统需要时间来跟随更新后的频率,而加密系统可能通过更快地改变频率来避免能量窃取。此外,先前的系统需要一个额外的传感器线圈。为解决这些问题,我们优化了攻击方法及相关系统,使其能在0.2毫秒内侵入并窃取能量。其关键在于消除了耗时的最大接收电流调节环节。同时,我们使用主接收线圈而非任何额外的传感器天线来检测磁场。因此,新硬件更为简化。仿真模型与实验结果证明了该攻击对加密无线功率的快速响应速度,并窃取了65%的功率。总体而言,该攻击的适用性得到了极大提升,为强化加密留下的空间更少。结果表明,能量接入保护亟需高度重视。