A SCADA system is a distributed network of cyber-physical devices used for instrumentation and control of critical infrastructures such as a electric power grid. With the emergence of the smart grid, SCADA systems are increasingly required to be connected to more open systems and security becomes crucial. However, many of these SCADA systems have been deployed for decades and were initially not designed with security in mind. In particular, the field devices in these systems are vulnerable to false command injection from an intruding or compromised device. But implementing cryptographic defence on these old-generation devices is challenging due to computation constraints. Consequently, solutions to protect legacy SCADA systems have to be an add-on. This paper discusses two add-on defence strategies for legacy SCADA systems -- the data diode and detect-and-respond approaches -- and compares their security and application scenarios. A generic architectural framework is also proposed to implement the detect-and-respond strategy, with an instantiation to demonstrate its practicality.
翻译:SCADA系统是一个分布式的网络物理装置网络,用来对电网等关键基础设施进行仪器操作和控制,随着智能电网的出现,SCADA系统越来越需要连接到更开放的系统,安全变得至关重要。然而,许多SCADA系统已经部署了几十年,最初设计时没有考虑到安全。特别是,这些系统中的外地装置很容易受到干扰或损坏装置的虚假指令注射。但是,由于计算限制,对这些老旧装置实施加密防御是困难的。因此,保护遗留的SCADA系统的解决办法必须加起来。本文讨论了遗留的SCADA系统的两个附加防御战略 -- -- 数据二极管和探测及响应方法 -- 并比较其安全和应用设想。还提出了一个通用建筑框架,以实施探测和响应战略,同时说明其实用性。