Established approaches to assuring safety-critical systems and software are difficult to apply to systems employing machine learning (ML). In many cases, ML is used on ill-defined problems, e.g. optimising sepsis treatment, where there is no clear, pre-defined specification against which to assess validity. This problem is exacerbated by the "opaque" nature of ML where the learnt model is not amenable to human scrutiny. Explainable AI methods have been proposed to tackle this issue by producing human-interpretable representations of ML models which can help users to gain confidence and build trust in the ML system. However, there is not much work explicitly investigating the role of explainability for safety assurance in the context of ML development. This paper identifies ways in which explainable AI methods can contribute to safety assurance of ML-based systems. It then uses a concrete ML-based clinical decision support system, concerning weaning of patients from mechanical ventilation, to demonstrate how explainable AI methods can be employed to produce evidence to support safety assurance. The results are also represented in a safety argument to show where, and in what way, explainable AI methods can contribute to a safety case. Overall, we conclude that explainable AI methods have a valuable role in safety assurance of ML-based systems in healthcare but that they are not sufficient in themselves to assure safety.
翻译:确保安全关键系统和软件的既定办法难以适用于采用机器学习的系统(ML),在许多情况下,ML用于处理定义不清的问题,例如优化防毒剂治疗,因为没有明确和预先界定的规格来评估有效性,这个问题由于ML的“不透明”性质而更加严重,因为所学模型不适于人类检查。提出了可解释的AI方法来解决这个问题,办法是制作人与人之间解释的显示ML模型,帮助用户获得信心和建立信任ML系统。然而,在ML开发过程中,没有明确调查安全保证的解释作用,但没有做多少工作。本文确定了可解释的AI方法如何有助于以ML为基础的系统的安全保障。然后,它使用基于具体ML的临床决定支持系统,涉及从机械通风中断除病人,以说明如何使用可解释的AI方法来提供证据来支持安全保障。结果还体现在安全论点中,说明在什么方面可以解释安全保证的AI方法本身在安全方面不能保证以什么方式解释安全。我们从整体上得出结论,在有效的AI系统中不能充分解释安全性。