In the high-stakes race to develop more scalable blockchains, some platforms (Binance, Cosmos, EOS, TRON, etc.) have adopted committee-based consensus (CBC) protocols, whereby the blockchain's record-keeping rights are entrusted to a committee of elected block producers. In theory, the smaller the committee, the faster the blockchain can reach consensus and the more it can scale. What's less clear, is whether such protocols ensure that honest committees can be consistently elected, given blockchain users typically have limited information on who to vote for. We show that the approval voting mechanism underlying most CBC protocols is complex and can lead to intractable optimal voting strategies. We empirically characterize some simpler intuitive voting strategies that users tend to resort to in practice and prove that these nonetheless converge to optimality exponentially quickly in the number of voters. Exponential convergence ensures that despite its complexity, CBC exhibits robustness and has some efficiency advantages over more popular staked-weighted lottery protocols currently underlying many prominent blockchains such as Ethereum.
翻译:在开发更可伸缩的链条的激烈竞争中,一些平台(Binance、Cosmos、EOS、TRON等)已经通过了基于委员会的协商一致协议(CBC),据此,块链的保存记录权被委托给一个当选的块块生产者委员会。理论上,委员会越小,块链越能达成共识,其规模就越大。 较不清楚的是,这种协议能否确保诚实的委员会能够一致地当选,因为块链用户通常对谁能投票的信息有限。 我们表明,大多数CBC协议的审批机制非常复杂,可以导致棘手的最佳投票战略。 我们从经验上将用户往往在实践中采用的一些更简单的直觉投票战略定性为,并证明这些战略尽管其复杂,但选民数量迅速趋于最佳化。 指数趋同可以确保CBC表现出稳健,而且对于目前作为Eieum等许多重要块链根基的更受欢迎的有价次的彩票协议具有效率优势。