In this work, we establish a game-theoretic framework to study cross-layer coordinated attacks on cyber-physical systems (CPSs), where the attacker can simultaneously interfere the physical process and launch jamming attacks on the communication channels while the defender can dodge the jamming by dispensing with observations. The generic framework captures a wide variety of classic attack models on CPSs. Leveraging dynamic programming techniques, we fully characterize the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) control strategies. We also specify the SPE observation and jamming strategies through dynamic programming equations and provide efficient computational methods to compute them. The results demonstrate that the physical and the cyber attacks are coordinated and depend on each other. On one hand, the control strategies are linear in the estimate, and the large estimate error caused by jamming will induce performance degradation. On the other hand, the capability in the physical layer has a significant impact on the observation and jamming strategies. Numerical examples illustrate the interesting interactions between the defender and the attacker through their observation and jamming strategies.
翻译:在这项工作中,我们建立了一个游戏理论框架,以研究对网络物理系统的跨层次协调攻击,攻击者可以同时干扰物理过程,对通信渠道发动干扰攻击,而捍卫者则可以通过喷射观测避开干扰。通用框架捕捉了多种典型攻击模式,利用动态编程技术,我们充分描述子游戏完美平衡(SPE)控制战略的特点。我们还通过动态编程方程式指定了SPE观测和干扰战略,并提供有效的计算方法来计算这些战略。结果显示,物理和网络攻击是相互协调的,并且相互依赖。一方面,控制战略在估计中是线性的,而干扰造成的大估计错误将导致性能退化。另一方面,物理层的能力对观测和干扰战略有重大影响。数字实例说明了捍卫者和攻击者通过观察和干扰战略进行有趣的互动。