Trust is of paramount concern for tenants to deploy their security-sensitive services in the cloud. The integrity of VMs in which these services are deployed needs to be ensured even in the presence of powerful adversaries with administrative access to the cloud. Traditional approaches for solving this challenge leverage trusted computing techniques, e.g., vTPM, or hardware CPU extensions, e.g., AMD SEV. But, they are vulnerable to powerful adversaries, or they provide only load time (not runtime) integrity measurements of VMs. We propose WELES, a protocol allowing tenants to establish and maintain trust in VM runtime integrity of software and its configuration. WELES is transparent to the VM configuration and setup. It performs an implicit attestation of VMs during a secure login and binds the VM integrity state with the secure connection. Our prototype's evaluation shows that WELES is practical and incurs low performance overhead.
翻译:对于租户来说,在云层中部署安全敏感服务至关重要。即使有强大的对手在行政上可以进入云层,也需要确保这些服务的 VMs的完整性。解决这一挑战的传统方法利用信任的计算技术,例如 vTPM 或硬件 CPU 扩展,例如AMD SEV。但是,他们容易受到强大的对手的伤害,或者他们只提供VMs的负载时间(而不是运行时间)完整性测量。我们建议WELES,一个允许租户在VM运行时软件及其配置方面建立和保持信任的协议。WELES对VM配置和设置是透明的。它在安全登录期间对VMs进行隐含的证明,并将VM完整性状态与安全连接起来。我们的原型评价显示,WELES是实用的,并且导致低性能管理。