We describe a model for polarization in multi-agent systems based on Esteban and Ray's standard measure of polarization from economics. Agents evolve by updating their beliefs (opinions) based on an underlying influence graph, as in the standard DeGroot model for social learning, but under a confirmation bias; i.e., a discounting of opinions of agents with dissimilar views. We show that even under this bias polarization eventually vanishes (converges to zero) if the influence graph is strongly-connected. If the influence graph is a regular symmetric circulation, we determine the unique belief value to which all agents converge. Our more insightful result establishes that, under some natural assumptions, if polarization does not eventually vanish then either there is a disconnected subgroup of agents, or some agent influences others more than she is influenced. We also show that polarization does not necessarily vanish in weakly-connected graphs under confirmation bias. We illustrate our model with a series of case studies and simulations, and show how it relates to the classic DeGroot model for social learning.
翻译:我们描述一个基于Esteban和Ray标准经济两极分化衡量标准的多试剂系统中的两极分化模式。代理商通过根据基本影响图更新其信仰(观点)而演变,如在标准的DeGroot社会学习模式中,但有确认偏差;即对不同观点的代理商的意见进行折扣;我们表明,即使根据这种偏差,如果影响图联系紧密,两极分化最终也会消失(连接到零)。如果影响图是一个定期的对称循环,我们确定所有代理商聚集的独特信仰价值。我们更深刻的洞察结果证明,在一些自然假设下,如果两极化最终没有消失,那么就会有一个互不相连的代理商分组,或者一些代理商对其他人的影响比她受到的影响更大。我们还表明,在存在确认偏差的薄弱关联的图表中,两极化并不一定消失(连接到零 ) 。我们用一系列案例研究和模拟来说明我们的模型,并展示它与典型的DeGroot社会学习模式的关系。