Physical unclonable function (PUF) has been proposed as a promising and trustworthy solution to a variety of cryptographic applications. Here we propose a non-imaging based authentication scheme for optical PUFs materialized by random scattering media, in which the characteristic fingerprints of optical PUFs are extracted from stochastical fluctuations of the scattered light intensity with respect to laser challenges which are detected by a single-pixel detector. The randomness, uniqueness, unpredictability, and robustness of the extracted fingerprints are validated to be qualified for real authentication applications. By increasing the key length and improving the signal to noise ratio, the false accept rate of a fake PUF can be dramatically lowered to the order of 10^-28. In comparison to the conventional laser-speckle-imaging based authentication with unique identity information obtained from textures of laser speckle patterns, this non-imaging scheme can be implemented at small speckle size bellowing the Nyquist--Shannon sampling criterion of the commonly used CCD or CMOS cameras, offering benefits in system miniaturization and immunity against reverse engineering attacks simultaneously.
翻译:提出了一种对各种加密应用的有希望和值得信赖的物理不可调试功能(PUF),作为各种加密应用的一种有希望和值得信赖的解决方案。在这里,我们提议了一种对通过随机散射媒介实现的光学阻燃剂的非基于成形的认证办法,其中光学阻燃剂的特征指纹是从一个单像素探测器检测到的激光挑战的分散光强度的草率波动中提取出来的。对提取的指纹的随机性、独特性、不可预测性和坚固性进行了验证,以证明其符合真实认证应用的资格。通过增加关键长度和改进对噪音的信号率,假的PUF的虚假接受率可以大幅降至10 ⁇ -28级的顺序。与常规的激光光谱光谱成成像的认证标准相比,这种非成形计划可以在小型的分光尺寸上实施,这是常用的CCD或CMOS照相机的Nyquist-hann抽样标准,在系统上提供微型和避免反向工程攻击的好处。