While the adoption of Service-Oriented Architectures (SOA) eases the implementation of features such as autonomous driving and over-the-air updates, it also increases the vehicle's exposure to attacks that may place road-users in harm. To address this problem, standards (ISO 21434/UNECE) expect manufacturers to produce security arguments and evidence by carrying out appropriate threat analysis. As key threat analysis steps, e.g., damage/threat scenario and attack path enumeration, are often carried out manually and not rigorously, security arguments lack precise guarantees, e.g., traceability w.r.t. safety goals, especially under system updates. This article proposes automated methods for threat analysis using a model-based engineering methodology that provides precise guarantees with respect to safety goals. This is accomplished by proposing an intruder model for automotive SOA which together with the system architecture and the loss scenarios identified by safety analysis are used as input for computing assets, impact rating, damage/threat scenarios, and attack paths. To validate the proposed methodology, we developed a faithful model of the autonomous driving functions of the Apollo framework, a widely used open-source autonomous driving stack. The proposed machinery automatically enumerates several attack paths on Apollo, including attack paths not reported in the literature.
翻译:虽然采用以服务为主的建筑(SOA)使自动驾驶和超空更新等特征的实施更加容易,但也增加了车辆遭受可能使道路使用者受到伤害的攻击的风险,为解决这一问题,标准(ISO 21434/UNECE)期望制造商通过进行适当的威胁分析,提出安全论据和证据。由于主要的威胁分析步骤,例如损害/威胁情景和攻击路径查点,往往是手工进行的,而不是严格地进行,安全论据缺乏准确的保障,例如可追踪性(w.r.t.)安全目标,特别是在系统更新方面。本文章提议采用基于模型的工程方法进行威胁分析的自动化方法,为安全目标提供精确的保障。为了达到这一目的,提出了汽车SOA的入侵模型,连同系统架构和安全分析所确定的损失假设情景,被用作计算资产、影响评级、损害/威胁情景和攻击路径的投入。为了验证拟议的方法,我们开发了阿波罗框架自主驾驶功能的忠实模型,这是广泛使用的开放源驱动器。拟议机器在攻击路径上自动罗列了几条攻击路径,包括攻击路径。