Recent works have proposed new Byzantine consensus algorithms for blockchains based on epidemics, a design which enables highly scalable performance at a low cost. These methods however critically depend on a secure random peer sampling service: a service that provides a stream of random network nodes where no attacking entity can become over-represented. To ensure this security property, current epidemic platforms use a Proof-of-Stake system to select peer samples. However such a system limits the openness of the system as only nodes with significant stake can participate in the consensus, leading to an oligopoly situation. Moreover, this design introduces a complex interdependency between the consensus algorithm and the cryptocurrency built upon it. In this paper, we propose a radically different security design for the peer sampling service, based on the distribution of IP addresses to prevent Sybil attacks. We propose a new algorithm, $\scriptstyle{BASALT}$, that implements our design using a stubborn chaotic search to counter attackers' attempts at becoming over-represented. We show in theory and using Monte Carlo simulations that $\scriptstyle{BASALT}$ provides samples which are extremely close to the optimal distribution even in adversarial scenarios such as tentative Eclipse attacks. Live experiments on a production cryptocurrency platform confirm that the samples obtained using $\scriptstyle{BASALT}$ are equitably distributed amongst nodes, allowing for a system which is both open and where no single entity can gain excessive power.
翻译:最近的工作提出了基于流行病的新Byzantine共识算法,该算法使高度可缩放的性能能够以低廉的成本实现高度可缩放。这些方法关键地取决于安全的随机同侪抽样服务:提供随机网络节点的服务,没有任何攻击实体可以过度代表。为了确保这种安全特性,目前的流行病平台使用一个“验收”系统来选择同侪样本。然而,这样一个系统限制了系统的开放性,因为只有具有重大利害关系的节点才能参与共识,从而导致寡头垄断局面。此外,这一设计在协商一致算法和所建的加密货币之间引入了复杂的相互依存性。在本文件中,我们提议对同侪抽样服务采用完全不同的安全设计,根据IP地址的分布来防止Sybil攻击。我们提议一种新的算法,即用固执的混乱搜索来对付攻击者过于公开的企图。我们从理论上和使用蒙特卡洛模拟,即用美元(标注的)美元来计算平价的平价标准。我们用模型来证实最接近最佳的汇率模型,而采用最接近的汇率的汇率,可以确认最佳分配模式。