Many centralized matching markets are preceded by interviews between participants. We study the impact on the final match of an increase in the number of interviews for one side of the market. Our motivation is the match between residents and hospitals where, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, interviews for the 2020-21 season of the National Residency Matching Program were switched to a virtual format. This drastically reduced the cost to applicants of accepting interview invitations. However, the reduction in cost was not symmetric since applicants, not programs, previously bore most of the costs of in-person interviews. We show that if doctors can accept more interviews, but the hospitals do not increase the number of interviews they offer, then no previously matched doctor is better off and many are potentially harmed. This adverse consequence is the result of what we call interview hoarding. We prove this analytically and characterize optimal mitigation strategies for special cases. We use simulations to extend these insights to more general settings.
翻译:许多集中的匹配市场之前先是参与者之间的访谈。我们研究了对市场一方面试次数增加的最终匹配的影响。我们的动机是居民和医院之间的匹配,由于COVID-19大流行,2020-21年全国居住匹配方案季节的访谈被转换为虚拟格式。这极大地降低了接受面试邀请的申请人的费用。然而,费用下降并不对称,因为申请人,而不是程序,以前承担了面对面访谈的大部分费用。我们显示,如果医生能够接受更多的面试,但医院不增加他们提供的访谈次数,那么以前匹配的医生就没有更好的了,许多可能受到损害。这种不利后果是我们所谓的访谈藏匿的结果。我们用分析来证明这一点,并用最佳的缓解战略来描述特殊情况。我们用模拟方法将这些洞察力扩大到更普遍的场合。