Channel hopping provides a defense mechanism against jamming attacks in large scale \ac{iot} networks.} However, a sufficiently powerful attacker may be able to learn the channel hopping pattern and efficiently predict the channel to jam. In this paper, we present FOLPETTI, a MAB-based attack to dynamically follow the victim's channel selection in real-time. Compared to previous attacks implemented via DRL, FOLPETTI does not require recurrent training phases to capture the victim's behavior, allowing hence a continuous attack. We assess the validity of FOLPETTI by implementing it to launch a jamming attack. We evaluate its performance against a victim performing random channel selection and a victim implementing a MAB defence strategy. We assume that the victim detects an attack when more than $20\%$ of the transmitted packets are not received, therefore this represents the limit for the attack to be stealthy. In this scenario, FOLPETTI achieves a $15\%$ success rate for the victim's random channel selection strategy, close to the $17.5\%$ obtained with a genie-aided approach. Conversely, the DRL-based approach reaches a success rate of $12.5\%$, which is $5.5\%$ less than FOLPETTI. We also confirm the results by confronting FOLPETTI with a MAB based channel hopping method. Finally, we show that FOLPETTI creates an additional energy demand independently from its success rate, therefore decreasing the lifetime of IoT devices.
翻译:然而,一个足够强大的攻击者也许能够了解频道选择模式,并有效地预测干扰的渠道。在本文中,我们介绍FOLPETTI, 一种以MAB为基础的攻击,以动态方式实时跟踪受害者选择频道的情况。与以前通过DRL实施的攻击相比,FOLPETTI并不要求经常的培训阶段来捕捉受害者的行为,从而允许持续攻击。我们通过实施干扰攻击来评估FOLPETTI的有效性。我们评估它对于进行随机频道选择的受害者和采用MAB防御战略的受害者的表现。我们假设受害者在没有收到20美元以上所传送的包裹时会侦测攻击,因此这是袭击隐蔽的限度。在这种情况下,FOLPETTI的随机选择策略获得了15,000美元的成功率,接近于17.5美元,因此我们以Genie-LTTI获得的频率为基, 也显示FPEFL5的成功率。