Physical isolation, so called air-gapping, is an effective method for protecting security-critical computers and networks. While it might be possible to introduce malicious code through the supply chain, insider attacks, or social engineering, communicating with the outside world is prevented. Different approaches to breach this essential line of defense have been developed based on electromagnetic, acoustic, and optical communication channels. However, all of these approaches are limited in either data rate or distance, and frequently offer only exfiltration of data. We present a novel approach to infiltrate data to and exfiltrate data from air-gapped systems without any additional hardware on-site. By aiming lasers at already built-in LEDs and recording their response, we are the first to enable a long-distance (25m), bidirectional, and fast (18.2kbps in & 100kbps out) covert communication channel. The approach can be used against any office device that operates LEDs at the CPU's GPIO interface.
翻译:虽然可以通过供应链、内幕攻击或社会工程来引入恶意代码,但防止了与外部世界的沟通。根据电磁、声波和光学通信渠道开发了不同的防线。然而,所有这些方法在数据率或距离方面都有局限性,而且往往只提供数据过滤。我们提出了一个新颖的方法,将数据渗入和从空中定位的系统中提取数据,而不在现场增加任何硬件。通过将激光射入已经内置的LED系统并记录其反应,我们是第一个促成长距离(25米)、双向和快速(18.2kbps in & 100kbps out)秘密通信渠道的远程(18.2kbps)。该方法可以用来对付在CPU GPI接口操作LED的办公室设备。