Due to the current horizontal business model that promotes increasing reliance on untrusted third-party Intellectual Properties (IPs), CAD tools, and design facilities, hardware Trojan attacks have become a serious threat to the semiconductor industry. Development of effective countermeasures against hardware Trojan attacks requires: (1) fast and reliable exploration of the viable Trojan attack space for a given design and (2) a suite of high-quality Trojan-inserted benchmarks that meet specific standards. The latter has become essential for the development and evaluation of design/verification solutions to achieve quantifiable assurance against Trojan attacks. While existing static benchmarks provide a baseline for comparing different countermeasures, they only enumerate a limited number of handcrafted Trojans from the complete Trojan design space. To accomplish these dual objectives, in this paper, we present MIMIC, a novel AI-guided framework for automatic Trojan insertion, which can create a large population of valid Trojans for a given design by mimicking the properties of a small set of known Trojans. While there exist tools to automatically insert Trojan instances using fixed Trojan templates, they cannot analyze known Trojan attacks for creating new instances that accurately capture the threat model. MIMIC works in two major steps: (1) it analyzes structural and functional features of existing Trojan populations in a multi-dimensional space to train machine learning models and generate a large number of "virtual Trojans" of the given design, (2) next, it binds them into the design by matching their functional/structural properties with suitable nets of the internal logic structure. We have developed a complete tool flow for MIMIC, extensively evaluated the framework by exploring several use-cases, and quantified its effectiveness to demonstrate highly promising results.
翻译:由于目前的横向商业模式促进日益依赖不受信任的第三方知识财产(IPs)、CAD工具和设计设施,硬木炭攻击已成为对半导体工业的严重威胁。 制定针对硬木炭攻击的有效对策需要:(1) 迅速和可靠地探索可行的特洛伊攻击空间以进行特定设计,(2) 一套符合特定标准的高质量特洛伊加插基准,后者对于开发和评价设计/核查解决方案以实现对特洛伊攻击的量化保证至关重要。虽然现有的静态基准为比较不同对策提供了一个基准,但它们仅从完整的特洛伊设计空间中列举了数量有限的手工制造的功能性木炭攻击。为了实现这些双重目标,我们在本文件中介绍了一个用于自动插入特洛伊的新型特洛伊攻击空间空间空间空间空间空间空间空间空间空间空间空间空间空间空间空间系统的新指导框架,通过对已知的小型特洛伊攻击的特性进行模拟。(2) 使用固定的特洛伊框架自动插入特洛伊事件,但无法分析已知的完整Trojan攻击情况,以便从整个特洛伊设计空间空间系统设计空间空间空间系统的现有结构模型中产生一个高数值。