In online advertising markets, setting budget and return on investment (ROI) constraints are two prevalent ways to help advertisers (i.e. buyers) utilize limited monetary resources efficiently. In this work, we provide a holistic view of ROI and budget constrained markets. We first tackle the buyer's bidding problem subject to both budget and ROI constraints in repeated second-price auctions. We show that the optimal buyer hindsight policy admits a "threshold-based" structure that suggests the buyer win all auctions during which her valuation-to-expenditure ratio is greater than some threshold. We further propose a threshold-based bidding framework that aims to mimic the hindsight bidding policy by learning its threshold. We show that when facing stochastic competition, our algorithm guarantees the satisfaction of both budget and ROI constraints and achieves sublinear regret compared to the optimal hindsight policy. Next, we study the seller's pricing problem against an ROI and budget constrained buyer. We establish that the seller's revenue function admits a bell-shaped structure, and then further propose a pricing algorithm that utilizes an episodic binary-search procedure to identify a revenue-optimal selling price. During each binary search episode, our pricing algorithm explores a particular price, allowing the buyer's learning algorithm to adapt and stabilize quickly. This, in turn, allows our seller algorithm to achieve sublinear regret against adaptive buyer algorithms that quickly react to price changes.
翻译:在网上广告市场中,设定预算和投资回报限制是帮助广告商(即买方)有效利用有限货币资源的两种普遍方式,在网上广告市场中,设定预算和投资回报限制是帮助广告商(即买方)有效利用有限货币资源的两种普遍方式。在这项工作中,我们提供了对皇家投资限制和预算限制的全面看法。我们首先解决买方的投标问题,在重复的二次价格拍卖中既受预算限制,又受皇家投资限制的限制。我们表明,最佳买方后视政策承认一种“基于门槛的”结构,表明买方赢得了所有拍卖,其估值与支出比率高于某些门槛。我们进一步提议一个基于门槛的投标框架,目的是通过学习其门槛来模仿后视审查的投标政策。我们表明,在面临质疑性竞争时,我们的算法保证了对预算和皇家投资限制的满意度,并取得了与最佳后视政策相比的亚线性遗憾。我们研究了卖方对皇家投资公司定价问题和预算限制的买主的定价问题。我们确定,卖方的收入功能迅速承认一种按正形结构,然后进一步提出一种基于硬性定价的定价的算算法,从而在销售每家的硬性价格分析过程中,使买方的每进进价分析程序中进行一项硬性价格调整,从而进行某种搜索。