Safety risk assessment is an essential process to ensure a dependable Cyber-Physical System (CPS) design. Traditional risk assessment considers only physical failures. For modern CPS, failures caused by cyber attacks are on the rise. The focus of latest research effort is on safety-security lifecycle integration and the expansion of modeling formalisms for risk assessment to incorporate security failures. The interaction between safety and security lifecycles and its impact on the overall system design, as well as the reliability loss resulting from ignoring security failures are some of the overlooked research questions. This paper addresses these research questions by presenting a new safety design method named Cyber Layer Of Protection Analysis (CLOPA) that extends existing LOPA framework to include failures caused by cyber attacks. The proposed method provides a rigorous mathematical formulation that expresses quantitatively the trade-off between designing a highly-reliable versus a highly-secure CPS. We further propose a co-design lifecycle process that integrates the safety and security risk assessment processes. We evaluate the proposed CLOPA approach and the integrated lifecycle on a practical case study of a process reactor controlled by an industrial control testbed, and provide a comparison between the proposed CLOPA and current LOPA risk assessment practice.
翻译:安全风险评估是确保可靠的网络-物理系统设计的必要过程; 传统风险评估只考虑物理故障; 传统风险评估只考虑物理故障; 现代计算机攻击导致的故障正在上升; 最新研究工作的重点是安全-安全生命周期一体化,并扩大风险评估模式的建模形式主义,以纳入安全故障; 安全和安保生命周期之间的互动及其对整个系统设计的影响,以及忽视安全故障造成的可靠性损失是一些被忽视的研究问题; 本文通过介绍名为“保护分析网络层”的新的安全设计方法(CLOPA)处理这些研究问题,该方法将现有的LOPA框架扩大到包括网络袭击造成的故障; 拟议方法提供严格的数学公式公式,从数量上表明设计高度可靠与高度安全的计算机-安保系统之间的权衡。 我们还提议共同设计生命周期进程,将安全和安保风险评估进程结合起来。 我们评估拟议的CLOPA方法和综合生命周期,对工业控制试验台控制的流程反应堆的实际案例研究进行比较。