Industrial cyber-physical systems (ICPSs) manage critical infrastructures by controlling the processes based on the "physics" data gathered by edge sensor networks. Recent innovations in ubiquitous computing and communication technologies have prompted the rapid integration of highly interconnected systems to ICPSs. Hence, the "security by obscurity" principle provided by air-gapping is no longer followed. As the interconnectivity in ICPSs increases, so does the attack surface. Industrial vulnerability assessment reports have shown that a variety of new vulnerabilities have occurred due to this transition while the most common ones are related to weak boundary protection. Although there are existing surveys in this context, very little is mentioned regarding these reports. This paper bridges this gap by defining and reviewing ICPSs from a cybersecurity perspective. In particular, multi-dimensional adaptive attack taxonomy is presented and utilized for evaluating real-life ICPS cyber incidents. We also identify the general shortcomings and highlight the points that cause a gap in existing literature while defining future research directions.
翻译:近期的计算机和通信技术创新促使高度相互联系的系统与比较方案系统迅速融合。因此,不再遵循航空拖网提供的“隐蔽安全”原则。随着比较方案之间的互联性增加,攻击表面也随之增加。工业脆弱性评估报告表明,由于这一过渡,出现了各种新的脆弱性,而最常见的弱点与薄弱的边界保护有关。虽然在这方面进行了调查,但很少提到这些报告。本文从网络安全角度界定和审查比较方案系统,从而弥补了这一差距。特别是,提出了多维的适应性攻击分类,用于评价比较方案实际生活中的网络事件。我们还查明了总缺点,并着重指出了在界定未来研究方向的同时造成现有文献差距的要点。