We construct the first secure multiparty quantum computation with public verifiable identifiable abort (MPQC-PVIA) protocol, where PVIA security enables outside observers with only classical computational power to agree on the identity of a malicious party in case of an abort. Moreover, our MPQC is the first quantum setting to provide Best-of-Both-Worlds (BoBW) security, which attains full security with an honest majority and is secure with abort if the majority is dishonest. At the heart of our construction is a generic transformation called Auditable Quantum Authentication (AQA) that publicly identifies the malicious sender with overwhelming probability. Our approach comes with several advantages over the traditional way of building MPQC protocols. First, instead of following the Clifford code paradigm, our protocol can be based on a variety of authentication codes. Second, the online phase of our MPQC requires only classical communications. Third, our construction can achieve distributed computation via a carefully crafted protocol design, which can be adjusted to an MPQC that conditionally guarantees output delivery.
翻译:我们用可公开核查的堕胎(MPQC-PVIA)协议构建了第一个安全的多党量计算,其中PVIA安全使外部观察家(只有传统的计算能力)能够就出现堕胎时恶意方的身份达成一致。此外,我们的MPQC是第一个提供最佳世界(BBW)安全的数量设置,它以诚实多数获得完全安全,如果多数人不诚实,则可以安全中止。我们建设的核心是一个通用的转换,称为可审计量子认证(AQA),它能以极大的概率公开识别恶意发件人。我们的方法在传统的建立MPQC协议方式上有一些优势。首先,我们的程序可以不遵循克里夫德代码模式,而以各种认证代码为基础。第二,我们的MPQC的在线阶段只需要传统的通信。第三,我们的建设可以通过精心设计的协议设计实现分配计算,该设计可以调整为有条件保证产出交付的MPQC。