We study network games in which players both create spillovers for one another and choose with whom to associate. The endogenous outcomes include both the strategic actions (e.g., effort levels) and the network in which spillovers occur. We introduce a framework and two solution concepts that extend standard approaches -- Nash equilibrium in actions and pairwise (Nash) stability in links. Our main results show that under suitable monotonicity assumptions on incentives, stable networks take simple forms. Our first condition concerns whether links create positive or negative payoff spillovers. Our second condition concerns whether actions and links are strategic complements or substitutes. Together, these conditions allow for a taxonomy of how network structure depends on economic primitives. We apply our model to understand the consequences of competition for status, to microfound matching models that assume clique formation, and to interpret empirical findings that highlight unintended consequences of group design.
翻译:我们研究网络游戏,让参与者彼此产生外溢效应,并选择与谁联系。内生结果包括战略行动(如努力水平)和溢出效应的网络。我们引入了扩展标准方法的框架和两个解决方案概念 -- -- 行动上的纳什平衡和双向(纳什)链接的稳定性。我们的主要结果显示,在适当的关于激励措施的单一假设下,稳定的网络以简单的形式出现。我们的第一个条件是,联系是否产生正或负的溢出效应。我们的第二个条件是,行动和联系是战略补充还是替代。这些条件加在一起,允许对网络结构如何依赖经济原始人进行分类。我们运用我们的模型来理解竞争对地位的影响,微化地建立组合的匹配模型,以及解释突出群体设计意外后果的经验结论。