We initiate the study of voting rules for participatory budgeting using the so-called epistemic approach, where one interprets votes as noisy reflections of some ground truth regarding the objectively best set of projects to fund. Using this approach, we first show that both the most studied rules in the literature and the most widely used rule in practice cannot be justified on epistemic grounds: they cannot be interpreted as maximum likelihood estimators, whatever assumptions we make about the accuracy of voters. Focusing then on welfare-maximising rules, we obtain both positive and negative results regarding epistemic guarantees.
翻译:----
昂贵选择的认知选择:参与性预算案例研究
我们采用所谓的认知方法来研究参与性预算的投票规则,其中我们将投票解释为对于最佳资助项目集的客观真实性的噪声反映。使用这种方法,我们首先展示了文献中最被研究的规则和实践中使用最广泛的规则无法在认知角度上进行证明:无论我们对投票者准确性做出什么假设,它们都无法被解释为最大似然估计器。然后,我们集中研究最大化福利的规则,在认知保证方面获得正面和负面的结果。