We present a novel model for capturing the behavior of an agent exhibiting sunk-cost bias in a stochastic environment. Agents exhibiting sunk-cost bias take into account the effort they have already spent on an endeavor when they evaluate whether to continue or abandon it. We model planning tasks in which an agent with this type of bias tries to reach a designated goal. Our model structures this problem as a type of Markov decision process: loosely speaking, the agent traverses a directed acyclic graph with probabilistic transitions, paying costs for its actions as it tries to reach a target node containing a specified reward. The agent's sunk cost bias is modeled by a cost that it incurs for abandoning the traversal: if the agent decides to stop traversing the graph, it incurs a cost of $\lambda \cdot C_{sunk}$, where ${\lambda \geq 0}$ is a parameter that captures the extent of the bias and $C_{sunk}$ is the sum of costs already invested. We analyze the behavior of two types of agents: naive agents that are unaware of their bias, and sophisticated agents that are aware of it. Since optimal (bias-free) behavior in this problem can involve abandoning the traversal before reaching the goal, the bias exhibited by these types of agents can result in sub-optimal behavior by shifting their decisions about abandonment. We show that in contrast to optimal agents, it is computationally hard to compute the optimal policy for a sophisticated agent. Our main results quantify the loss exhibited by these two types of agents with respect to an optimal agent. We present both general and topology-specific bounds.
翻译:我们展示了一种新模式,用来捕捉一个在随机环境中表现出低成本偏差的代理人的行为。 显示低成本偏差的代理人考虑到他们在评估是否继续或放弃它时已经付出的努力。 我们模拟规划任务,让一个具有这种偏差的代理人试图达到一个指定的目标。 我们的模型将这一问题构建成一个马可夫决策程序的类型: 粗略地说, 代理人在试图达到包含特定报酬的目标节点时, 支付其行动的成本。 显示低成本偏差的代理人在试图达到包含特定报酬的目标节点时, 计算出他们的行动的成本偏差。 我们分析两种复杂行为偏差的代理人的行为模式, 如果该代理人决定停止曲折, 就会造成$\lambda\cdounk} 成本。 美元是兰巴达\qegeda\q0}, 美元是衡量这种偏差程度的最优偏差的参数, 美元是已经投资的总和美元。 我们分析两种复杂的行为偏差的代理人的行为方式, 在两种不同的代理人面前, 显示他们的行为表现最优的代理人是没有意识。