Motivated by the emergence of popular service-based two-sided markets where sellers can serve multiple buyers at the same time, we formulate and study the {\em two-sided cost sharing} problem. In two-sided cost sharing, sellers incur different costs for serving different subsets of buyers and buyers have different values for being served by different sellers. Both buyers and sellers are self-interested agents whose values and costs are private information. We study the problem from the perspective of an intermediary platform that matches buyers to sellers and assigns prices and wages in an effort to maximize welfare (i.e., buyer values minus seller costs) subject to budget-balance in an incentive compatible manner. In our markets of interest, agents trade the (often same) services multiple times. Moreover, the value and cost for the same service differs based on the context (e.g., location, urgency, weather conditions, etc). In this framework, we design mechanisms that are efficient, ex-ante budget-balanced, ex-ante individually rational, dominant strategy incentive compatible, and ex-ante in the core (a natural generalization of the core that we define here).
翻译:在基于服务的双面市场的兴起下,卖方可以同时为多个买方提供服务,我们制定并研究双方分担费用的问题;在双面分担费用中,卖方为不同的买方和买方提供不同的服务,其价值不同;买方和卖方都是自我感兴趣的代理人,其价值和成本是私人信息;我们从中间平台的角度研究这一问题,该中介平台将买方与卖方匹配,并分配价格和工资,以尽量扩大福利(即买方价值减去卖方成本),但以预算平衡的方式加以调和;在我们的利益市场中,代理商(通常相同)服务进行多次交易;此外,同一服务的价值和成本根据具体情况(例如,地点、紧迫性、天气条件等)不同而不同;在这个框架内,我们设计高效、事先预算平衡、事先合理、主要战略激励机制,在核心(我们在此定义的核心的自然化核心)中相互兼容和事先保障。