The radical advances in telecommunications and computer science have enabled a myriad of applications and novel seamless interaction with computing interfaces. Voice Assistants (VAs) have become a norm for smartphones, and millions of VAs incorporated in smart devices are used to control these devices in the smart home context. Previous research has shown that they are prone to attacks, leading vendors to countermeasures. One of these measures is to allow only a specific individual, the device's owner, to perform possibly dangerous tasks, that is, tasks that may disclose personal information, involve monetary transactions etc. To understand the extent to which VAs provide the necessary protection to their users, we experimented with two of the most widely used VAs, which the participants trained. We then utilised voice synthesis using samples provided by participants to synthesise commands that were used to trigger the corresponding VA and perform a dangerous task. Our extensive results showed that more than 30\% of our deepfake attacks were successful and that there was at least one successful attack for more than half of the participants. Moreover, they illustrate statistically significant variation among vendors and, in one case, even gender bias. The outcomes are rather alarming and require the deployment of further countermeasures to prevent exploitation, as the number of VAs in use is currently comparable to the world population.
翻译:电讯和计算机科学的根本性进步使得大量应用和与计算机界面的无缝互动成为了多种应用和新颖的计算机界面。语音助理(VAs)已成为智能手机的常态,数以百万计的智能设备中所含的VAs被用于在智能家庭环境下控制这些设备。以前的研究表明,它们很容易受到攻击,导致供应商采取反措施。这些措施之一是只允许某个特定个人,即设备所有人,执行可能危险的任务,即可能披露个人信息的任务,涉及货币交易等。为了了解VAs为用户提供必要保护的程度,我们试验了两种最广泛使用的VAs,参与者已经培训了其中两种。我们随后利用参与者提供的样本合成声音合成这些设备,以合成用来触发相应的VA并执行一项危险的任务。我们的广泛结果显示,我们深度攻击的30多分以上成功,而且至少有半数以上的参与者成功地进行了一次攻击。此外,它们显示了供应商之间在统计上的巨大差异,有一个实例是性别偏见。结果令人吃惊的是,目前使用VA这一类比的反措施是使用。