Machine learning-based malware detection is known to be vulnerable to adversarial evasion attacks. The state-of-the-art is that there are no effective defenses against these attacks. As a response to the adversarial malware classification challenge organized by the MIT Lincoln Lab and associated with the AAAI-19 Workshop on Artificial Intelligence for Cyber Security (AICS'2019), we propose six guiding principles to enhance the robustness of deep neural networks. Some of these principles have been scattered in the literature, but the others are introduced in this paper for the first time. Under the guidance of these six principles, we propose a defense framework to enhance the robustness of deep neural networks against adversarial malware evasion attacks. By conducting experiments with the Drebin Android malware dataset, we show that the framework can achieve a 98.49\% accuracy (on average) against grey-box attacks, where the attacker knows some information about the defense and the defender knows some information about the attack, and an 89.14% accuracy (on average) against the more capable white-box attacks, where the attacker knows everything about the defense and the defender knows some information about the attack. The framework wins the AICS'2019 challenge by achieving a 76.02% accuracy, where neither the attacker (i.e., the challenge organizer) knows the framework or defense nor we (the defender) know the attacks. This gap highlights the importance of knowing about the attack.
翻译:众所周知,基于机器学习的恶意软件检测很容易受到对抗性规避攻击的伤害。 最先进的技术是没有针对这些攻击的有效防御。 作为对麻省林肯实验室和AAAI-19网络安全人工智能讲习班(AIC'2019)相关的对抗性恶意软件分类挑战的回应。 我们提出了六条指导原则,以加强深层神经网络的稳健性。 其中一些原则分散在文献中, 另一些原则首次在本文中被引入。 根据这六项原则的指导, 我们提议了一个防御框架, 以加强深层神经网络的稳健性, 以对抗对抗对抗敌对性恶意软件规避攻击。 通过与Drebin和机器人恶意软件数据集进行实验, 我们表明这个框架可以达到98. 49 ⁇ (平均) 准确度, 来对付灰箱攻击, 攻击者知道一些关于国防网络的信息, 捍卫者知道一些关于攻击的信息, 以及89.14%的准确度(平均) 来对付更有能力的白箱攻击。 根据这六项原则, 我们提出一个防御者和捍卫者知道所有关于防御性恶意恶意规避攻击的网络。 通过这个框架, 来了解某种知情性攻击。