Website Fingerprinting (WF) attacks are used by passive, local attackers to determine the destination of encrypted internet traffic by comparing the sequences of packets sent to and received by the user to a previously recorded data set. As a result, WF attacks are of particular concern to privacy-enhancing technologies such as Tor. In response, a variety of WF defenses have been developed, though they tend to incur a high bandwidth and latency overhead or require additional infrastructure, making them difficult to implement in practice. Some lighter-weight defenses have been presented as well; still, they attain only moderate effectiveness against recently published WF attacks. In this paper, we aim to present a realistic and novel defense, Regulator, that demonstrates improved overhead and high effectiveness against current WF attacks. In the closed-world setting, this defense reduces the accuracy of the state-of-the-art attack, Tik-Tok, against lightweight defenses from 66% to 22.9%. To achieve this performance, it requires minimal added latency and a bandwidth overhead 38.1% less than the leading lightweight defense. In the open-world setting, Regulator limits a precision-tuned Tik-Tok attack to an F-score of .087, compared to .625 for the best comparable lightweight defense.
翻译:被动的当地攻击者利用网站指纹(WF)攻击来确定加密互联网交通的目的地,办法是将寄给用户和用户收到的包裹序列与先前记录的数据集进行比较。因此,WF攻击对Tor等增强隐私的技术尤其令人关切。对此,开发了各种WF防御,尽管这些防御往往产生高带宽和延缓性高压,或需要额外的基础设施,但往往产生高带宽和延缓性高压,或使其难以实际执行。一些较轻的防御也已经提出;但是,它们仅对最近公布的WF攻击取得适度的效力。在本文中,我们的目标是提出现实和新颖的防御,即监管者,表明对当前WF攻击的顶部和高效力有所改善。在封闭世界的环境下,这种防御降低了最新攻击的准确性,即Tik-Tok,对轻重防御的精确度从66%降低到22.9 %。为了达到这一效果,它需要最低限度的加宽度和带宽度为38.1%,比前轻度防御低。在开放世界的设置中,监管者限制对当前WFW攻击的精确度和高度进行对比。