Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) drive industrial processes critical to society, e.g., water treatment and distribution, electricity and fuel networks. Search engines (e.g., Shodan) have highlighted that Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) are often left exposed to the Internet, one of the main reasons being the misconfigurations of security settings. This leads to the question -- why do these misconfigurations occur and, specifically, whether usability of security controls plays a part? To date, the usability of configuring PLC security mechanisms has not been studied. We present the first investigation through a task-based study and subsequent semi-structured interviews (N=19). We explore the usability of PLC connection configurations and two key security mechanisms (i.e., access levels and user administration). We find that the use of unfamiliar labels, layouts and misleading terminology exacerbates an already complex process of configuring security mechanisms. Our results uncover various (mis-) perceptions about the security controls and how design constraints, e.g., safety and lack of regular updates (due to long term nature of such systems), provide significant challenges to realization of modern HCI and usability principles. Based on these findings, we provide design recommendations to bring usable security in industrial settings at par with its IT counterpart.
翻译:搜索引擎(例如Shodan)强调,可编程逻辑控制器(PLC)往往会暴露在互联网上,其主要原因之一是安全环境的不配置。这导致一个问题 -- -- 这些错误的配置为何会发生,具体来说,安全管制的可用性是否具有一定作用?迄今为止,尚未研究配置PLC安全机制的可用性。我们通过基于任务的研究和随后的半结构性访谈(N=19)提出第一次调查。我们探讨了可编程逻辑控制器(PLC)的可用性,以及两个关键安全机制(即准入级别和用户管理)的可用性。我们发现,使用不熟悉的标签、布局和误导术语加剧了一个已经十分复杂的安全机制配置进程。我们发现,对安全管制和设计制约的各种(错误)认识,例如,安全和缺乏现代安全性更新,从而提供了这些系统的长期安全性,从而提供了在对等安全系统的实现性。