Object detectors, which are widely deployed in security-critical systems such as autonomous vehicles, have been found vulnerable to physical-world patch hiding attacks. The attacker can use a single physically-realizable adversarial patch to make the object detector miss the detection of victim objects and completely undermines the functionality of object detection applications. In this paper, we propose ObjectSeeker as a defense framework for building certifiably robust object detectors against patch hiding attacks. The core operation of ObjectSeeker is patch-agnostic masking: we aim to mask out the entire adversarial patch without any prior knowledge of the shape, size, and location of the patch. This masking operation neutralizes the adversarial effect and allows any vanilla object detector to safely detect objects on the masked images. Remarkably, we develop a certification procedure to determine if ObjectSeeker can detect certain objects with a provable guarantee against any adaptive attacker within the threat model. Our evaluation with two object detectors and three datasets demonstrates a significant (~10%-40% absolute and ~2-6x relative) improvement in certified robustness over the prior work, as well as high clean performance (~1% performance drop compared with vanilla undefended models).
翻译:在诸如自主车辆等安全关键系统中广泛部署的物体探测器,被发现容易受到物理世界隐蔽装置攻击。攻击者可以使用单一有形的对称网格,使物体探测器无法探测受害者物体,完全破坏物体探测应用程序的功能。在本文件中,我们提议“物体搜寻者”作为防御框架,用于建立可证实可靠的物体探测器,以抵御隐蔽装置攻击。“物体搜寻者”的核心操作是补丁牙掩蔽:我们的目标是在不事先了解补丁的形状、大小和位置的情况下遮盖整个对称网格。这种遮掩行动可以消除对抗性效果,使任何香草物体探测器能够安全地探测遮蔽图像上的物体。值得注意的是,我们开发了一个认证程序,以确定“物体观察者”是否能够探测到某些物体,并有针对威胁模型内任何适应性攻击者的可靠保证。我们用两个对象探测器和三个数据集进行的评估显示,在对先前工作的经认证的稳健性方面有重大改进(~10%绝对值和~40%相对值)。