Ransomware is a growing threat that typically operates by either encrypting a victim's files or locking a victim's computer until the victim pays a ransom. However, it is still challenging to detect such malware timely with existing traditional malware detection techniques. In this paper, we present a novel ransomware detection system, called "Peeler" (Profiling kErnEl -Level Events to detect Ransomware). Peeler deviates from signatures for individual ransomware samples and relies on common and generic characteristics of ransomware depicted at the kernel-level. Analyzing diverse ransomware families, we observed ransomware's inherent behavioral characteristics such as stealth operations performed before the attack, file I/O request patterns, process spawning, and correlations among kernel-level events. Based on those characteristics, we develop Peeler that continuously monitors a target system's kernel events and detects ransomware attacks on the system. Our experimental results show that Peeler achieves more than 99\% detection rate with 0.58\% false-positive rate against 43 distinct ransomware families, containing samples from both crypto and screen-locker types of ransomware. For crypto ransomware, Peeler detects them promptly after only one file is lost (within 115 milliseconds on average). Peeler utilizes around 4.9\% of CPU time with only 9.8 MB memory under the normal workload condition. Our analysis demonstrates that Peeler can efficiently detect diverse malware families by monitoring their kernel-level events.
翻译:Ransomware是一种日益增大的威胁,通常是在受害者支付赎金之前加密受害者档案或锁住受害者计算机。然而,用现有的传统恶意软件探测技术及时发现这种恶意软件仍然具有挑战性。在本文中,我们提出了一个名为“Peeler”的新的赎金软件检测系统(Profil KErnEl-Dalvel 事件以探测Ransomware ) 。Peeler偏离了个人赎金软件样本的签名,并依赖于在内核一级描绘的赎金软件的普通和通用特性。我们分析各种赎金软件的家庭,我们观察到了赎金软件的固有行为特征,如袭击前进行的隐形操作、I/O请求模式、进程产卵和内核事件之间的关联。基于这些特征,我们开发了不断监控目标系统内核事件并检测系统内的赎金袭击。我们的实验结果显示,Peelerererer得到超过99的检测率, 与43个不同的赎金家庭相比,0.58 ⁇ 假的检测率。 对于不同的赎金家庭来说, 包含我们正常的纸质文件的样本,只有C平均时间级的测算。