Autonomous vehicles (AVs) rely on pervasive connectivity to enable cooperative and safety-critical applications, but this connectivity also exposes them to a wide range of cybersecurity threats. Existing perimeter-based security and centralized identity management approaches are inadequate for highly dynamic V2X environments, as they depend on implicit trust and suffer from scalability and single-point-of-failure limitations. This paper proposes D-IM, a Zero Trust-based decentralized identity management and authentication framework for secure V2X communication. D-IM integrates continuous verification with a permissioned blockchain to eliminate centralized trust assumptions and enforce explicit, verifiable identity relationships among vehicles and infrastructure. The framework is designed around clear Zero Trust-aligned goals, including mutual authentication, decentralization, privacy protection, non-repudiation, and traceability, and addresses a comprehensive attacker model covering identity, data integrity, collusion, availability, and accountability threats. We present the D-IM system architecture and identification and authorization protocol, and validate its security properties through both qualitative analysis and a formal BAN logic-based verification. Simulation results in urban and highway scenarios using DSRC and C-V2X demonstrate that D-IM introduces limited overhead while preserving network performance, supporting its practicality for real-world AV deployments.
翻译:自动驾驶汽车(AVs)依赖泛在的连接性以实现协同和安全关键型应用,但这种连接性也使其暴露于广泛的网络安全威胁之下。现有的基于边界的安全和集中式身份管理方法无法适应高度动态的V2X环境,因为它们依赖于隐式信任,并存在可扩展性和单点故障的局限性。本文提出了D-IM,一个基于零信任的去中心化身份管理与认证框架,用于保障V2X通信安全。D-IM将持续验证与许可区块链相结合,以消除集中式信任假设,并在车辆与基础设施之间强制执行明确、可验证的身份关系。该框架围绕清晰的零信任对齐目标进行设计,包括双向认证、去中心化、隐私保护、不可否认性和可追溯性,并针对一个涵盖身份、数据完整性、共谋、可用性和问责威胁的全面攻击者模型进行了应对。我们介绍了D-IM的系统架构、身份识别与授权协议,并通过定性分析和基于形式化BAN逻辑的验证来证明其安全特性。在城区和高速公路场景下使用DSRC和C-V2X的仿真结果表明,D-IM在保持网络性能的同时引入了有限的开销,这支持了其在现实世界自动驾驶汽车部署中的实用性。