IP anycast is used for services such as DNS and Content Delivery Networks (CDN) to provide the capacity to handle Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks. During a DDoS attack service operators redistribute traffic between anycast sites to take advantage of sites with unused or greater capacity. Depending on site traffic and attack size, operators may instead concentrate attackers in a few sites to preserve operation in others. Operators use these actions during attacks, but how to do so has not been described systematically or publicly. This paper describes several methods to use BGP to shift traffic when under DDoS, and shows that a response playbook can provide a menu of responses that are options during an attack. To choose an appropriate response from this playbook, we also describe a new method to estimate true attack size, even though the operator's view during the attack is incomplete. Finally, operator choices are constrained by distributed routing policies, and not all are helpful. We explore how specific anycast deployment can constrain options in this playbook, and are the first to measure how generally applicable they are across multiple anycast networks.
翻译:IP 播客用于 DNS 和 内容提供网络 (CDN) 等服务, 以提供处理分布式拒绝服务(DDoS) 攻击的能力。 在 DDoS 攻击服务操作员中, DDoS 攻击服务员可以在任何播客点之间重新分配流量, 以利用未使用或能力更大的网站。 根据现场交通量和攻击规模, 操作员可以将攻击者集中到几个网站, 以维护其他网站的操作。 操作员在攻击中使用这些行动, 但并没有系统或公开地描述这样做。 本文描述了在DDoS 下使用 BGP 转换交通的几种方法, 并显示响应手册可以提供攻击期间选择的响应菜单。 为了从此播放手册中选择一个适当的响应, 我们还描述了一种新的方法来估计真正的攻击规模, 即使操作员在攻击中的观点不完整。 最后, 操作员的选择受到分布式路由政策的限制, 并不是全部的帮助。 我们探索任何特定部署如何限制此播放手册中的选项, 并且是第一个测量他们如何在多个播客网络上普遍适用的方法 。